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Religious Mediators 
in Palestine
The rule of law in the Palestinian terri-
tories must be addressed in its histori-
cally unique context. Complex forms of 
legal pluralism have obtained in Pales-
tine since Ottoman times. After 1967, 
the judiciary was subjected to exter-
nal control through Israeli occupation 
and military rule. However, following 
the signing of the Oslo agreements in 
1993/4, a secular judiciary was reinsti-
tuted under the auspices of the Pal-
estinian Authority, as well as a sharia 
court system whose role was, however, 
reduced from that of a general tribunal to that of a forum dealing 
with personal status issues. This dual system was superimposed on 
a long-standing network of customary institutions of conflict resolu-
tion, based on lineage or tribal councils, collective land administration 
assemblies, and public reconciliation committees. These institutions 
have not only endured the political upheavals of the twentieth cen-
tury, but, in recent years, also seen their roles diversified, transformed 
and perhaps reinforced through the absence (until 1993) and present 
debility of the Palestinian proto-state, the very existence of which is 
now threatened. In this complex and versatile field of conflict resolu-
tion, new actors have appeared while classical players are taking on 
new roles.
Since the eruption of the second Intifada in September 2000, an 
on-going process of spatial and social fragmentation has taken place. 
Firstly, the construction of the separation fence/wall, destined to be-
come a 640 kilometres long barrier, annexes de facto large portions of 
territory while severing the Palestinian communities, fields and fami-
lies. Secondly, some 540 checkpoints and hundreds of settlements 
have turned the West Bank into a patchwork of ghettos whose only 
access to each other is through an Israeli military checkpoint. Thirdly, 
parallel to the above-mentioned processes, the systematic weakening 
of the apparatus of the Palestinian Authority (PA), combined with the 
disintegration of the military wings of various political factions into 
dozens of militant groups, has not only weakened the judicial and po-
lice systems, but, more importantly, undermined more classical con-
flict resolution mechanisms based on kinship and other forms of social 
proximity. Thus, throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, new actors, 
notably da‘iyyat and qudah, have stepped in to fill the breach in concil-
iatory mechanisms and save the now isolated communities that form 
the nation from total chaos by appealing to the only remaining con-
necting principle, namely the common reference to “Islamic values.” 
Yet female da‘iyyat and male qudah differ significantly with regard to 
the gendered definition of their sphere of intervention in homes, inac-
cessible to men, and religious institutions, such as mosques, as well 
as interpersonal networks, charities and governmental institutions, 
notwithstanding their spatial and modes of operation. In the light of 
the present polarization between a secular bureaucracy, dominated 
by Fatah (the recently defeated ruling party), and the newly elected 
Hamas government, until now, such conciliatory mechanisms have 
played a key role in maintaining a high degree of social coherence in a 
nation that has never formed a state yet has experienced four decades 
of occupation. Whether this solidarity will persist is, however, an open 
question. 
Male religious leaders as mediators
Despite the relative decline of the sharia judiciary, the qadi of the 
personal status court, as a public figure, still retains a considerable de-
gree of moral influence in his community. His authority in the context 
of extra-formal conflict resolution mechanisms transcends his adminis-
trative and legal attributes. In contrast 
to many qudah in Ottoman Palestine, 
who were transferred every year so 
as to preclude local involvement, the 
contemporary qadi in the Palestinian 
Territories tends to be a full-fledged 
member of the community. This em-
beddedness has far-reaching implica-
tions, influencing spheres beyond the 
domain of personal status and affect-
ing significant aspects of social prac-
tice, community life, and political en-
counters.
In the current Palestinian social context, the qadi emerges as a key actor 
not only in regulating relations within and between families or descent-
based groups or those bound by matrimonial alliance, but more impor-
tantly as a community leader approached in his capacity as an imam, a 
preacher or simply a “respected person,” to sponsor a solution or initiate 
a settlement. It seems that respectability, trust, and wisdom are the main 
attributes, which legitimize the intervention of particular person as a me-
diator acceptable to opposed parties. The fact that these same qualifica-
tions are prerequisites for the qudah, appointment in the formal system 
of the sharia court puts him in a pre-eminent position in matters of con-
flict management as compared with other intermediaries. This standing 
must today be understood in a context of weakness of the formal judicial 
system, which, as a consequence, tends to empower the qadi and permits 
him to occupy a greater space than he enjoyed earlier. Hence, his exercise 
of active authority renders his resolutions suitable for settling most sorts 
of conflicts between community members or groups without major ob-
jections being raised.
The centrality of his role should not, however, lead one to underestimate 
either the role of networks that crosscut or overarch the kinship-based 
relations of community members, bonds of patronage and dependency, 
or any other system based on formal justice, whether secular or religious. 
Indeed, there are several authorities or actors to whom individuals can 
turn for assistance before asking the qadi to intervene. These include 
kin, friends, neighbours, and family or lineage elders, including makhatir 
(sing. mukhtar),1 extended family councils, police officers or relations of 
influence in Palestinian Authority institutions. Salha, a poor, 34-year-old 
widow, approached a qadi to resolve a dispute with her brother-in-law 
over a “high” payment promised to her by an insurance company after 
the death of her husband. The brother-in-law wanted to use his guardi-
anship over her children to profit from their father’s insurance. Had the 
dispute been between two Gazan notables, it is doubtful that the case 
would ever have reached the qadi. The matter would, of necessity, have 
been settled en famille. Once the case had been presented to the qadi, 
a specific range of options emerged, ranging from the judge’s refusal to 
consider the case at all, through opening the road to a “customary” solu-
tion to his formulating of a legal decision that would gravely affect Salha. 
In practice, qudah most often opt for an “inventive,” median solution that 
avoids irrevocable consequences for the parties from their kin and soci-
ety at large. Only a systematic exploration of the contextual decisional 
process in cases involving fundamental moral principles would enable us 
to understand the qudah’s socially and ethically situated practice. After 
listening to Salha, the qadi contacted her family’s mukhtar. The next day, 
both agreed to resolve the dispute at the council. For more than a week, 
they kept up negotiations with the family’s powerful figures. Holding the 
uncle responsible through the hamula was a way of exerting pressure on 
him through the collectivity. Eventually, through mechanisms of nego-
tiation, persuasion, and agreement, a solution was reached that allowed 
Salha to keep her children and receive the insurance payment and even 
obliged the brother-in-law to pay their nafaqa to her.
The spatial and social fragmentation of 
the Palestinian territories has not only 
weakened judicial and police systems, but 
also undermined classical conflict resolution 
mechanisms based on kinship and other 
forms of social proximity. In this context, new 
religious mediators are gaining ground. The 
author shows that by appealing to “Islamic 
values” as the only remaining connecting 
principle, these new legal actors have played 
a key role in preventing the disintegration of 
now isolated communities.
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The study of the qudah, extra-formal intervention thus presupposes dis-
tinguishing a number of spheres of potential intervention beyond his 
formal role in the sharia court. All social and power resources are differen-
tially available to the qadi according to time, context, and the social sta-
tus of parties. They converge to model specific decisions, thereby setting 
limits to his moral authority.
Female sub-mediators
The phenomenon of da‘iyyat arose in the Palestinian Territories more 
than a decade ago, after the emergence of the Palestinian Authority and 
the challenges it posed to the political and social operation of the Islam-
ist movements. Over time, the role of the da‘iyyat has been significantly 
transformed from that of educators advocating Islamic values in mosques 
and charity centres to active involvement in various issues related to com-
munity and social life, including interventions in public and private con-
flicts.
These voluntary activists often come from a middle class background 
and enjoy a high level of education; most have a BA or higher degree in a 
variety of specializations such as medicine, agriculture, architecture, and, 
obviously, Islamic studies. Despite denying any explicit political commit-
ment, a number of informants indicate that they are attached to the social 
infrastructure of the main Islamic political party (Hamas) or, to a lesser 
degree, of the Islamic Jihad movement.
In the course of their activism, da‘iyyat meet hundreds of women from 
various regions, generations, statuses, and classes. They often take the 
lead in introducing women from different backgrounds to each other and 
design shared teaching programmes and various activities for different 
communities, which indicates the importance of social networking for 
their activism. Part of their daily agenda is to follow their “clients” to their 
homes; they regularly pay visits, both at times of crisis and of celebra-
tion. Their female “clients,” in response, make them privy to their intimate 
problems as well as more “public” conflicts. This might be the most in-
teresting question in the study of the roles and actions of da‘iyyat, their 
modes of intervention in the social conflicts submitted to them by their 
female “clients.” The preliminary data indicate that the motivation for their 
intervention in social conflicts is not public status; rather, their interven-
tion is veiled behind their religious activity. They seem to prefer confining 
themselves to the role of sub-mediators between the parties to a dispute 
and the principal mediators, i.e., those “wise” men who share with them 
both their religious background and willingness to resolve communal 
conflicts. Studying their activism may therefore provide us with further 
insights regarding the careful gender division of labour, political vs. non-
political activism, and the public-private division. 
The variety of cases in which da‘iyyat intervene is vast: domestic dis-
putes, sexual harassment and assaults, adultery, inheritance, financial 
disputes, land disputes, etc. The male leaders of the community do not 
seem to feel threatened by their activism, unlike their reaction to other 
outspoken feminist activists. Despite their advocacy for women’s rights 
(regardless of what that means), their religious background and Islamic 
perspective ensure them a positive reception in the community. The in-
terventions of the da‘iyyat, may, I believe, (as in the case of their coun-
terparts, the qudah) fill the gap left by the increasing vulnerability of the 
formal justice system of the Palestinian Authority. Further, the fact that 
these new actors have gradually earned the people’s trust may also sig-
nify a degree of scepticism with regard to the neutrality, influence, and 
legitimacy of other informal systems. 
The da‘iyyat have a particular method of dealing with community dis-
putes including those related to political conflicts between Hamas and 
Fatah. For example, in 2004, a sixteen-year-old young man was arrested 
by the preventive security force (one of the many security branches func-
tioning in Gaza) on the basis of his membership of Hamas and his involve-
ment in preparing crude bullets. His mother was one of the followers of Dr. 
Salma, who is one of the most active da‘iyya in Gaza. Dr. Salma, who does 
not deny her sympathy for Hamas, however has good relations with Fatah 
(then the ruling party) through her kinship with a high-ranking official in 
the Ministry of Islamic Endowment (awqaf). She approached him with the 
argument that the first half should not imprison the second half of the 
nation. This is Dr. Salma’s conception of the polarised political matrix in 
Gaza between Fatah and Hamas. The man, on his part, approached the 
top security head to release the boy, astonishingly using the same argu-
ment as Dr. Salma: “it is unfair for one half of the nation, which dominates 
the political scene, to imprison the other half.” After several attempts by 
the Shaykh of awqaf, the boy was released and returned to his mother. 
What is significant and requires deeper theorization, which unfortunate-
ly is beyond the scope of this short article, is Dr. Salma’s advice to the 
mother: “Our God works for our good, even if His decisions seem to be 
illogical to us. Your boy may or may not come back. We should work hard 
to release him, but if we cannot do so, we have to look beyond our agony. 
God may want to teach us how to be patient, compliant, and accommo-
dating through such tests.” Thus, while doing her best to release the boy, 
Dr. Salma’s advice to the mother was that of acceptance and confession. 
This approach is not unique in the discourse of da‘iyyat. They teach their 
followers to work hard to improve their living conditions, but at the same 
time they train them to accept the hardships of being truly pious. 
In conclusion, there is a need to examine not only the roles of these 
new actors in conflict resolution but also the position they occupy vis-à-
vis other justice systems. Thus, their interventions 
should not be perceived as a linear process; rather, 
they should be viewed in their emergence, devel-
opment, transformations, and shifts, in terms of the 
objectives of the parties involved and their terms 
of settlement. There are areas of overlap and inter-
section, or, alternatively, conflict and contradiction 
in the course of disputing and resolution. This im-
plies the need to document conflicts through their 
entire duration so as to understand at which stage 
particular institutions are invited to intervene, the 
reasons for their success or failure, and the choices 
to be made by both disputers and mediators.
Note
1. Literally, the “selected person.” In 
contemporary Palestine, one must 
distinguish between makhatir designated 
according to the principle of locality and 
those designated on the basis of descent. 
The former act on behalf of the sharia 
court and the civil authorities, mainly in 
marriage-related disputes. The descent-
based makhatir are not recognized by the 
authorities; they are designated by their kin 
to mediate in conflicts within and between 
wider patrifocal descent groups.
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